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· Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. In a separate
article, I consider Supreme Court selection as war, while in this article I focus on the
selection of lower court judges as war. I completed this article six months before the midterm elections of 2002. Together, I trust these articles will serve as a useful overview of the
general phenomenon of judicial selection as war. In these and other works, I have
benefited enormously from the empirical studies of judicial selection done by other
scholars, including three participants in this Symposium - Sheldon Goldman, Elliot
Slotnick, and Carl Tobias. I am especially grateful to John Oakley and Carl Tobias for the
opportunity to participate in this Symposium.
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INTRODUCTION

A popular metaphor for describing judicial selection is war. One need
look no further for confirmation of the continuing pull of this metaphor
than newspaper reports on the implications of the Senate Judiciary
Committee's recent rejection of Charles Pickering's nomination by
President George W. Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
1
Circuit. In one report, veteran reporter Neil Lewis of The New York
Times employs the term "battle" six times, including in the headline, to
describe the nature of the likely conflicts arising over judicial
2
nominations in anticipation of the next Supreme Court vacancy.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of the Pickering
nomination- and its implications- seem to confirm the threat made at
the outset of George W. Bush's presidency by some prominent
Democrats. They warned that there would be a "war" if, after the
Supreme Court's controversial opinion in Bush v. Gar/ short-circuiting
Vice-President Gore's challenge to the vote count in Florida, Bush tried
to claim a mandate to nominate conservative ideologues outside of the
4
mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence. After September 11, 2001,
some Republican senators and administration officials suggested,
however, that the war against terrorism obliges senators to give special
deference to the President's judicial nominees. Such deference would
ensure a fully staffed judiciary available to properly monitor and process
5
criminal proceedings coming out of the war against terrorism.

' See Executive Business Meeting Summary, Senate Judiciary Comm., Mar. 14, 2002,
available at http:/ /www.senate.gov /%7Ejudiciary /summary /ex031402.pdf (providing the
votes not to report Charles Pickering's nomination favorably, unfavorably, and without
recommendation).
' Neil A. Lewis, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for Future Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2002, at A21.
3
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
4
See BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGffiMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Jack M.
Balkin, Bush's Negative Mandate Narrows His Nominees, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, available at
http: I I www.yale.edu /lawweb/jbalkin/opeds/negativemandateopedl.htm (suggesting
that Bush's belief that he had such a mandate was illustrated by his nomination of Linda
Chavez as Labor Secretary in January 2001).
' See Hearing on Military Tribunals Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101" Cong. (2001),
reprinted in FDCH Political Transcripts (Dec. 4, 2001), (statement by Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(stating that "[the Senate Judiciary Committee] would better serve the public by looking for
ways to help, instead of distracting the administration which has the enormous task on its
hands and is doing a super job under very difficult circumstances...one obvious way we
could help is to confirm the nominees languishing in this committee for important jobs
including judgeships"); Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing, available at
http: I /www.whitehouse.gov I news/releases/2001 I 12/print/20011221-7.html (stating that
"the president deserves to have his team in place, particularly during a time of war ... and
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Moreover, it would ensure that conflicts over the nominees would not
divert precious time and political capital the President needs to
successfully wage the war.
Perhaps the most serious problem with this argument is that the
6
structure of the Constitution is plainly designed to invite conflict.
Anyone familiar with the process of judicial selection knows just how
combative and vitriolic contests over judicial appointments can be.
Though not always short, their nastiness and brutality seem otherwise to
exemplify the infamous conditions Thomas Hobbes described as existing
7
within the state of nature.
The structure of the Constitution pits
presidents and senators against each other in the appointments process.
The framers fully expected, and even hoped, that conflicts would ensue
8
from this design. Their expectation was that the constitutional checks
and balances, including the distribution of authority on judicial
appointments, were designed so that "ambition must be made to
9
counteract ambition." The framers viewed conflicts as inevitable and
even desirable. The ensuing friction would act to prevent one branch
from aggrandizing power at the expense of others. It also would prevent
one authority from becoming tyrannical.
Yet, the structure of the Constitution invites not only conflicts but also
accommodations. In relatively short order, presidents and senators
developed informal accommodations or arrangements to reduce the
inevitability of conflict and yet preserve some realm of discretion with
respect to judicial appointments. These accommodations, expectations,
1
or arrangements are institutional norms. ° Following institutional norms
generally produces peaceful co-existence between presidents and
senators rather than sanctions.
My thesis is relatively simple. Hostilities break out in the process for
selecting lower court judges under two circumstances. The first is when
the President, senators, and/or nominees violate some long-standing

the American people deserve to have their government fully staffed and they deserve a
court system that can fully carry out justice").
6
See also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) (describing, inter alia, the dynamics
resulting from the allocation of authority set forth in the Appointments Clause).
7
Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 84 O.C.A. Gaskin, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 17-29 (describing
framers' expectations regarding appointments).
• THE FEDERALIST No. 51 349 Garnes Madison) Oacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
10
See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal
Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687 n.3 (2001) (defining institutional norms)[hereinafter
Gerhardt, Norm Theory].
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practices or expectations (some but not all of which constitute
institutional norms). Alternatively, hostilities break out when the
applicable institutional norms are in flux. I suggest this basic dynamic
11
persists regardless of whether the nation is at war. History generally
suggests that judicial appointments entail a give-and-take in which
presidents and senators negotiate over their respective achievements of
various short and long-term objectives. How well presidents and
senators achieve their respective objectives and discharge their allimportant duties relating to judicial selection depends on their
compliance with and coordination of the governing norms and
expectations at the time appointments must be made. Presidents and
senators obviously do not perform in a vacuum; context is all important,
but context does not guarantee particular outcomes. The fact that the
nation is at war is, of course, an important part of the context of present
times, but it is not, and likely will not, make a difference to the process of
judicial selection. A judicial appointment offers presidents, and at least
some senators, an opportunity to negotiate over their respective
objectives. How presidents and senators will view their opportunity,
however, will depend on their respective calculations of their short and
long-term needs. These calculations depend a great deal on the context
in which they are made, including the perennial needs for both
presidents and senators to reward friends, penalize foes, influence the
direction of the lower courts, or to effectuate trading or deals to facilitate
other legislative priorities and objectives.
My purpose is not to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate some
significant patterns in federal judicial selection. In Part I, I will briefly
clarify some basic terminology, discuss the relevance of statistics, and
identify some basic institutional norms in federal judicial selection.
These norms include, among others: senatorial courtesy; good faith
consultation with the Senate; nominees' fitting the basic ethical and
professional expectations of the times; making timely nominations;
substantial senatorial discretion in pacing the confirmation process;
following (or at least not altering) basic vetting procedures; and
responsible rhetoric in framing the terms of initial debate.
With this general framework in mind, I focus in Part II on conflicts
between senators and presidents who have failed to adequately heed or
account for a relatively robust institutional norm, long-standing practice,
or expectation regarding judicial selection. These conflicts have followed
two patterns. The first has involved presidents' attempts to re-shape

11

For some prior discussions of this view, see GERHARDT, supra note 6.
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some basic practices or procedures relating to judicial selection. Indeed,
perhaps the most serious battle now occurring within the judicial
appointments process is to develop a new norm or understanding
regarding the requisite ideology for a judge. The second category of
conflicts consists of presidents' failures to follow the governing norms in
filling specific vacancies. The reasons for these failures have been varied,
including over-confidence, negligence, competing priorities, and of
course payback.
Part III consists of models of accommodation. The first is capitulation
or presidential abdication of authority, as epitomized by the Harding
administration. The second model consists of an overview of the
strategies employed by presidents and senators to achieve their
respective objectives through negotiation or management of various
institutional norms. This model also encompasses the practices relating
to appointing judges in the midst of war. As illustrated by a review of
several war-time presidents (including Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon), presidents have been
able to achieve relatively conflict-free confirmation proceedings for
judicial nominees in the midst of war when they, rather than the Senate,
have been willing to bend or compromise in defining the terms for
judicial selection.
I. TERMSOFENGAGEMENT

A few introductory clarifications are in order. First, my models reflect
an important dynamic in the selection process. They are premised on the
unusual power and opportunity that presidents have to set the terms of
debate in a confirmation proceeding. Senators have more limited,
though significant power to set or influence the agenda in a confirmation
proceeding, because they are largely confined in the process to a
defensive posture. In structural terms, this means that senators face the
structural disadvantage of being in a defensive posture throughout the
12
appointment process in which they are restricted to exercising a veto.
Senators have tried to compensate for their structural disadvantage
through various means. One solution has been to develop various
procedures and norms to facilitate the influence and input of individual
senators and the Judiciary Committee leadership on judicial
appointments.

See generally John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss & Sunstein, 71 TEx. L. REv. 633 (1993).
12
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Second, the basic terms of war and norms need to be defined. I do not
mean to rely on strict terms of art for either term. I sometimes loosely
use the terms "battle" and "war," though I recognize the important
differences between them. Indeed, it is useful to keep in mind that a
contest over a particular judicial nomination is more like a battle than a
war, for it is waged against a backdrop of larger contests among national
political leaders. One important mechanism in these battles consists of
institutional norms.
Institutional norms refers to the informal
understandings or arrangements among the leadership of national
institutions developed over time, as well as the deviations from these
13
arrangements which often trigger sanctions or disapproval.
Finally, it is very important to recognize the institutional norms
applicable to the process of selecting lower court judges. The first and
most robust of these is senatorial courtesy. Senatorial courtesy takes at
14
least two forms in the appointments process. The first is the deference
usually (but admittedly not always) given by senators to the nomination
of a colleague to a federal judgeship. The Senate confirmed all six
senators nominated to the Supreme Court in the 20th century- Edward
Douglass White as Chief Justice, and as Associate Justices George
Sutherland, Hugo Black, Jimmy Byrnes, Harold Burton, and Sherman
15
Minton.
While presidents have generally succeeded in nominating
many former members of Congress (particularly from the House) to
16
lower federal courts, only two of these nominees were senators. In both
cases - Franklin Roosevelt's nomination of Sherman Minton to the
Seventh Circuit and Ronald Reagan's nomination of James Buckley to
the District of Columbia Circuit- the Senate overwhelmingly confirmed
17
the nominees.
The second form of senatorial courtesy is the deference given by
presidents to the choices of the senators from their parties for filling
vacant federal judgeships in their respective states. I examine conflicts
arising from breaches of this norm in more detail in the next part.

See Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 10.
" For a general discussion, see generally GERHARDT, supra note 6.
5
'
Even people who have served in the House of Representatives seem to have had
their nominations receive substantial deference from the Senate. In the twentieth century,
the former House members successfully nominated to the Court include William Moody as
Associate Justice and Fred Vinson as Chief Justice. See SUPREME COURT JuSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Melvin J. Umfsky ed., 1994).
16
See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 129-30.
17
See 87 CONG. REC. 54207 (1941) (confirming nomination of Sherman Minton to the
Seventh Circuit); 131 CONG. REC. S17737 (1985) (confirming nomination of James Buckley
to the District of Columbia Circuit).
13
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Another institutional norm is presidents' and senators' recognition of
the importance of nominating people from their parties to lower court
judgeships. In the 19th century, party affiliation increasingly became a
useful proxy and demonstration of a nominee's loyalty to a president's
(or key senators') preferred constitutional ideology and policy views.
Kermit Hall's excellent study of nineteenth-century lower court judicial
appointments demonstrates the increasing importance of partisanship in
18
judicial appointments. For instance, all of Grover Cleveland's lower
19
court appointees were Democrats. The statistical break down of the
party affiliations for modem presidents' appointees to lower courts
reflects similar degrees of significance of partisanship in their selection,
including the following: Franklin Roosevelt (98.5% for district judges
and 96% for circuit judges); Harry Truman (93.8% for district judges and
88.5% for circuit judges); Dwight Eisenhower (95.2 for district judges and
93.3% for circuit judges); John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson (92.1%
for district judges and 95.1% for circuit judges); Richard Nixon and
Gerald Ford (89.6% for district judges and 93.0% for circuit judges);
Jimmy Carter (90.6% for district judges and 82.1% for circuit judges);
Ronald Reagan (91.7% for district judges and 96.2% for circuit judges);
George H.W. Bush (88.5% for district judges and 89.2% for circuit
judges); and Bill Clinton (87.5% for district judges and 85.2% for circuit
20
judges). Moreover, Sheldon Goldman calculates striking statistics to
demonstrate the extent or percentage of a president's judicial
appointments based on a "partisan agenda" or made "to shore up
21
political support for the president or for the party."
According to
Goldman, presidents from Truman through Clinton had percentages of
circuit appointments made on the basis of facilitating their support
within their respective parties ranging from a high of 100% for President
Ford to a low of 25% for President Reagan, with every other president
22
above 70%.
There are several other norms in federal judicial selection. These
norms include good faith consultation with the Senate; nominating
18
KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLffiCS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECDON AND
THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-61 (Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979).
19
GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 129-30.
20
See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECDON FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final
Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy]; Sheldon
Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the
Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228 (2001) [hereinafter Clinton's Judges].
21
GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 3.
22
See id. at 208.
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people who satisfy the prevailing ethical and professional expectations
23
of the times; responsible or credible rhetoric in characterizing
24
nominees' credentials; timing; and basic procedures for vetting and
processing judicial nominations (including ratings of the quality of
25
judicial nominees by the American Bar Association). In the next two
parts, I explore the significance of deviations from these norms.
II. MODELS OF WAR
This Part surveys two basic models of conflict in lower court judicial
selection. In turn, I consider warrior presidents, who have invited
conflict, and other presidents, who have ignored or discounted
appointment norms at their own or their judicial nominees' peril.

A. The Warrior Presidents
In the classic The Art of War, Sun-Tzu makes two trenchant

observations that one might imagine would resonate with most
presidents in making Supreme Court nominations. The first is, "To win
26
without fighting is best." The other is, "The side that knows when to
fight and when not will take the victory. There are roadways not to be
27
traveled, armies not to be attacked, walled cities not to be assaulted."
One has to wonder why any president would disregard either of these,
but many seem to have done just that. So, one obvious question with
which to begin an analysis of the models of conflict within judicial
selection is why presidents sometimes welcome fights? That some do
In his exhaustive study of federal judicial selection from Franklin Roosevelt through
Reagan, Professor Goldman characterizes this norm as "the expectation that the president
and his administration will ordinarily choose persons who have the education, experience,
temperament, and reputation of legal acumen and integrity requisite for judicial office." Id.
at 4 n.c.
" 1his institutional norm is especially evident in Supreme Court selection. It is often
the case that each side in a judicial confirmation contest attempts to demonize the other.
The objective of the supporters of a nomination has been to demonize people who oppose
the nomination, while the opponents of a nomination have tended to demonize the
nominee. Interestingly, the efforts to demonize opposition tracks the rhetoric employed in
times of war. A recent headline in the New York Times suggestively reads, "A Nation Defines
Itself by its Evil Enemies." Robert F. Worth, A Nation Defines Itself by its Evil Enemies, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at Dl. The article suggests that in a war national leaders tend to rally
support by demonizing the enemy. Id. The same holds true in judicial confirmation
proceedings.
25
Shortly after taking office, President George W. Bush discontinued the policy. See
infra note 36 and accompanying text.
26
SUN-TZU, THE ART OF WAR at vii (Thomas Cleary trans., 1988).
27
Id. at 125.
23
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welcome contests is beyond any doubt. Some presidents - I call them
the warrior presidents - have deliberately taken approaches that have
provoked conflict with the Senate. The warrior presidents in American
history seem to have had at least one important thing in common: they
have invited heated conflicts over nominees for the sake of either
fortifying their prerogatives or re-shaping the basic norms of the process.
The most devastating defeats warrior presidents have had in the
judicial selection process have involved their direct attacks to weaken or
alter senatorial courtesy. At least three presidents, upon taking office,
immediately set their sights on challenging senatorial courtesy in lower
court judicial appointments. All three-Ulysses Grant, Herbert Hoover,
and Jimmy Carter - paid enormous prices, particularly within their
own parties, for their boldness.
Grant's first Attorney General, Ebenezer Hoar, angered Republican
senators by refusing to grant them carte blanche in their
recommendations for federal judges in their respective states. Instead,
he insisted on higher standards for judicial nominees, and many senators
28
balked. This insistence eroded good will between many senators and
the White House, and in the end it cost Grant and Hoar dearly when the
Senate refused to confirm Hoar's nomination as an Associate Justice in
retaliation for Hoar's conduct as Attorney General.
Interestingly, Herbert Hoover tried a similar tactic almost immediately
after taking office in 1928.
Hoover wanted to end patronage
appointments, particularly to the federal courts. Thus, at the outset of
his administration he released a statement that he intended to end the
practice of awarding judicial appointments based solely on patronage.
Instead, he planned to raise the standards and requisite qualifications for
29
As Sheldon Goldman observes, "Herbert
judicial appointments.
Hoover, with the aid of his attorney general, William Mitchell, attempted
to break the grip that Republican senators had on lower court
appointments in order to improve the quality of the appointees. This
resulted in several battles with Republican senators and ultimately in an
30
administration retreat." The retreat was only part of the bigger story,
for the battles helped to erode Hoover's relations with his fellow
Republicans in the Senate, so that over time he wielded increasingly less
influence over dictating both domestic policy and Supreme Court
28
See generally JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF 1HE SENATE: A STUDY OF
1HE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY 1HE UNITED STATES SENATE (Univ. of California

Press 1953).
29

GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 146.
"' GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 9.
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appointments. Before the end of his single term as president, he would
find himself at the other extreme from which he started and acquiesce to
the Senate's preferred candidate to replace Justice Oliver Wendell
31
Holmes.
In 1976, Jimmy Carter won the presidency based in part on his pledge
to base high-level appointments on merit rather than patronage.
Fulfilling his pledge required, inter alia, challenging senatorial courtesy
for the sake of improving the quality and diversity of judicial
32
appointments.
He tried through legislation, executive orders, and
negotiations to have merit-select commissions established that would
recommend a slate of qualified persons for each judicial vacancy. Over
time, serious friction developed between Carter and various senators
within his own party over their willingness to follow his criteria in
recommending candidates for various judgeships. Friction also existed
within Carter's own administration over the priorities for and means to
achieve administration objectives. It hardly helped that Carter's chief
rival for leadership of his party, Ted Kennedy, chaired the Judiciary
Committee. Ted Kennedy used his powers as Chairman to try to
implement new norms for judicial selection, and in some instances, to
thwart or embarrass Carter. While Carter succeeded in appointing
unprecedented numbers of women and minorities as federal district and
33
appellate judges, his success came at the enormous cost of fractured
relations with senators from his own party.
In two other instances, presidents have challenged basic procedures
for appointing judges other than senatorial courtesy generally. The first
involved President George H.W. Bush's frustration over Judiciary
34
Committee access to FBI reports. Just as the Judiciary Committee was
preparing to send Clarence Thomas' nomination as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court to the full Senate for final consideration, the
Judiciary Committee leaked Anita Hill's affidavit to the Justice
Department. This leak led to an embarrassing turnaround by the
Committee to re-open its hearings on Thomas. As part of the re-hearing,

" See HARRIS, supra note 28.
32
See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 236-84 (describing Carter's reform of
judicial selection).
" On diversifying judicial appointments, see generally Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender
Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. C!N. L. REV. 1237 (1993); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal
Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996); Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on
the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. REV. 1861 (1994); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial
Selection, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1257 (1993).
" See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 20, at 283-84.
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the Committee called Hill and re-called Thomas in dramatic, televised
appearances before the Committee to address her sexual harassment
charges against him. Thouph the Senate ultimately confirmed Thomas
3
by an extremely close vote, President Bush announced shortly after the
final vote that he had issued an order restricting the Committee's future
access to FBI reports. The order provoked an impasse that lasted for
three months while the Committee refused to process any pending
judicial nominations until it could arrange for its own investigation of
the backgrounds of nominees to substitute for the FBI reports. After
three months, the administration changed course by restoring access for
Committee members and staff to FBI reports, but with a stricter
accounting of who would be allowed to read the reports. The delay was
fatal to over two dozen subsequent judicial nominees, because the
nominees' earliest opportunities for hearings would not have been until
1992 at which point the Senate slowed the process to a complete
standstill pending the outcome of the presidential election.
More recently, President Bush's son, George W. Bush, openly
challenged a different procedure. Shortly after taking office, President
George W. Bush's White House Counsel announced the administration's
intentions to curtail the practice of the American Bar Association to pre36
screen possible judicial nominees. Ever since the ABA gave a mixed
rating to Robert Bark in his confirmation hearings, many Republicans
have questioned the organization's claim that its ratings are based on
professional credentials and not on the ideology of judicial nominees. In
1997, Senator Orrin Hatch, then the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, concluded that these questions had sufficient merit to justify
abandoning the ABA's privileged status in testifying about the quality of
judicial nominees. In spite of this edict, President Clinton continued to
consult informally with the ABA prior to making his judicial
nominations. President Bush decided, however, to deny the ABA any
privileged status in rating nominees. Democratic senators resented his
decision. After regaining control of the Senate in May 2001, Democratic
senators slowed down all pending judicial nominations to provide the
ABA with the opportunity to rate the quality of the President's

35
See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and
Confirmation o!Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 969,970 (1992) [hereinafter Gerhardt,
Divided Justice] (generally discussing the sequence of events culminating in Justice Thomas'
confirmation proceedings).
36
The ABA practice of screening possible judicial nominees began in 1946 and
extended through the end of the Clinton administration. See Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra
note 10, at 1712.
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37

nornmees.
Beyond the challenges that Presidents George H.W. and George W.
Bush have made to certain procedures in judicial selection, they joined
President Reagan in an attempt to establish a new norm of judicial
selection. Over the past two decades, one of the most common reasons
for opposing judicial nominees has been doubt about or opposition to
38
their likely judicial ideologies.
The extremely low percentage of
President Reagan's appellate court nominees made on the basis of
partisan considerations reflects his administration's emphasis on
39
ideology as an important, indispensable criterion for appointment.
With this emphasis, the Reagan administration introduced into the
modem era an approach to judicial selection that effectively counted a
candidate's likely ideology as the single, most important qualification for
his or her appointment as a judge.
Subsequent Republican
administrations have tried to emphasize ideology to a similar degree in
the nomination process. In addition, the vast majority of President
Clinton's judicial nominees who experienced substantial or fatal delays
in confirmation proceedings had their nominations opposed because of
40
Republican senators' distrust of their likely ideologies.
Both the Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of Judge Charles
41
42
Pickering, and the slow pace of judicial confirmation proceedings,
reflect Democrats' dual concerns for payback and for opposing what
they regard as extreme or outside-of-the-mainstream judicial ideologies.
The ensuing focus of both sides on judicial nominees' likely ideologies
reflects an important dynamic in judicial selection in which, in effect,
Republicans and Democrats are vying to define or control the formation
of a new norm of judicial selection. Rhetoric is an important weapon in
this battle, as the contending sides have each tried to characterize the
opposing sides' nominees in extremely unflattering terms. Each side
casts its nominees as within the mainstream and many of the other side's
nominees as well outside of it. In other words, Republicans and
See STUDY OF CmzENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS (March 6, 2002) (indicating that
judicial nominations have slowed down both to allow for ABA input on pending
nominations and to address anti-terrorist legislation in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001 attacks against the United States).
38
See generally CmZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLillCS AND
AMERICA'S COURTS (2000). This report has been recently updated.
39
See id.; Goldman, supra note 20, at 3.
"' See 145 CONG. REC. Sl1918 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1999) (providing vote on Ronnie White's
nomination).
41
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
37
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Democrats are vying to define the standard that they each can use as a
yardstick by which to measure the legitimate or appropriate ideologies
for judicial appointments. In short, they are fighting to define the
mainstream of constitutional law.
The fight to define the mainstream coincides strikingly with
unprecedented delays in the nomination and confirmation phases of the
judicial selection process. A recent report of Citizens for Independent
Courts indicates that the process for filling judicial vacancies is taking
longer than ever. The time for filling them has increased from 38 days
during the first two years of President Carter's term to 226 days during
the last two years of President Clinton's administration. The study
further indicates a steady decline in the percentage of a president's firstyear nominations confirmed by the Senate during that first year. The
Senate confirmed 93% of President Reagan's first-year judicial
nominations in 1981. In contrast, the Senate confirmed 44% of President
George W. Bush's nominations in 2001. Additionally, the Senate took
longer to confirm judges (an average of 112 days) in the first year of
President George W. Bush's administration than it had taken during
comparable periods of earlier administrations, with the exception of the
first year of President Clinton's second term (an average of 133 days).
The delays are due to various factors, including the change in Senate
leadership in mid-2001 and the fact that the Democrats have been
deferring Senate consideration of judicial nominations until they have
43
been reviewed by the ABA.
In numerous other instances, presidents have not launched broadscale attacks on senatorial courtesy or challenged basic procedures.
Instead, in the course of choosing particular nominees, presidents have
breached various institutional norms. These breaches have given rise to
the conflicts that I discuss in the next section.

43

The study further indicates, as I have suggested, that President George W. Bush (to
date) has taken a shorter amount of time to make nominations than his three predecessors.
On average, he nominated a candidate within 165 days of a vacancy (or the date he took
office), while the corresponding average for Clinton's first year was 253, for President
George H.W. Bush 193, and for President Reagan 191. Of course, one major difference
between President Bush and his three predecessors is that he is the only one not to have
allowed the ABA to rate the quality of the nominees prior to their formally being
nominated. The additional time required for the ABA to provide its ratings accounts in
part for both the quicker pace with which President Bush makes nominations and the
slower pace with which the Senate has been considering them. Id.
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B. Mistakes in War
The most common source of conflicts over judicial selection involves
presidents' failure to follow institutional norms or long-standing
expectations or practices. Presidents have failed to follow institutional
norms for numerous reasons. However, more often than not, these
failures can be traced to the specific circumstances in which presidents
choose, for political or other reasons, to prioritize other short- or longterm objectives.
The first significant failure, which every president has made, is not to
consult with the senator(s) from his party in the state for the judgeship(s)
he is trying to fill. This failure is almost invariably fatal to the
nomination's success, and perhaps most surprising, triggers sanctions
not from senators from the opposition party but from the President's
own party.
These sanctions have been applied, regardless of the President's
popularity. For instance, President Franklin Roosevelt was convinced
44
that senatorial courtesy was an antiquated concept. Consequently, he
sometimes ignored it to pursue other priorities, though in these instances
with virtually no success. For instance, in 1938, he nominated Floyd
Roberts, a New Deal supporter, to a federal district judgeship in
45
Virginia. The state's governor, former governors, and one influential
congressman supported both the New Deal and Roberts. Nevertheless,
the state's two Democratic senators, who were philosophically opposed
to the New Deal and thus to Roberts, effectively rallied other senators
partly on the ground of preserving the prerogative of senatorial courtesy.
Additionally, the two Virginia Senators helped spearhead the Senate
Judiciary Committee's rejection of the nomination 15-3 as well as the full
Senate's defeat of the nomination 72-9.
Interestingly, Roosevelt's subsequent strategy for filling the judgeship
paid homage to senatorial courtesy. Roosevelt offered the judgeship to
Armistead Dobie, then the dean of the University of Virginia School of
Law. Though Roosevelt had not consulted Virginia's Senators before
offering the position to Dobie, he did consult with them and got their
46
approval before formally forwarding the nomination to the Senate.
With the Senators on board, the nomination easily and quickly was
confirmed by the full Senate.

44

45
46

See GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 43.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43-44.
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In 1943, President Roosevelt made an even bolder attempt to bypass
senatorial courtesy, which failed. He nominated James Allred to fill a
47
federal district judgeship in Texas. Allred had the support of one Texas
48
senator and other influential Democratic leaders in the state, but he had
also run unsuccessfully to unseat the other Texas senator, W. Lee
O'Daniel. Not surprisingly, O'Daniel vigorously opposed nominating
his rival to fill the judgeship, and the Judiciary Committee split evenly
on recommending the nomination for the full Senate to consider. Allred
subsequently asked that his nomination be withdrawn. Nonetheless,
President Truman successfully appointed him as a federal judge after
O'Daniel had left the Senate.
Although as a former senator, Harry Truman should have understood
the importance of senatorial courtesy, he sometimes miscalculated and
failed to take senatorial courtesy into account in making nominations. In
one instance, he failed to consult with Georgia Senator Richard Russell
before he nominated M. Neil Andrews to a federal district judgeship in
49
Georgia. Truman had figured that he did not have to consult with
Russell on this appointment because he had already given Russell his
due by agreeing to another choice of Russell's for a different judicial
vacancy in his state. The problem was that Russell preferred a different
candidate, William Boyd Sloan, and thus vigorously opposed the
Andrews nomination. He initially helped to stall its consideration,
precipitating the President into giving Andrews a recess appointment
(just as Roosevelt had done with Roberts). Nevertheless, both the
Judiciary Committee and the full Senate voted to reject Andrews'
nomination. While Truman was not pleased with the rejection, he
reluctantly agreed to nominate Sloan to the judgeship, and the Senate
quickly confirmed him.
Another significant reason for frustrated or defeated judicial
nominations is poor timing. As Sheldon Goldman explains,
"Traditionally, minimal confirmation activity occurs during election
years, especially when the Senate is controlled by one party and the
50
White House by another." Statistics amply demonstrate the robustness
of this basic norm: for instance, at the end of 2000 the Senate had not
acted on 32 district and eight circuit court nominations made by
President Clinton; in 1992 the Senate had not acted on 42 district and five

47

Id. at 42.
" Id.

" See STUDY OF CmZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS at 71-72.
50
See Goldman, Bush's judicial Legacy, supra note 20, at 284.
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circuit court nominations made by the first President Bush. 5
Timing can make a big difference in judicial selection in a different
form - the pacing of the confirmation process. Over the years, senators
have developed numerous parliamentary mechanisms to facilitate their
input on judicial appointments.
Some of these have included:
individual senators' prerogative to place any judicial nominations
temporarily on hold; filibusters; the Judiciary Committee Chair's implied
authority to control the scheduling of hearings, numbers of witnesses,
and timing of votes; and the majority leader's authority to control
2
everything that comes to the floor of the Senate. 5 The instances in which
senators have used one or more of the means to frustrate judicial
nominations are numerous. As one might expect, senators employ these
mechanisms for many reasons, including protecting senatorial courtesy,
rewarding friends, payback, logrolling, and enforcing conceptions about
the proper qualifications for judicial appointments. Five examples
dramatically illustrate the significance of these mechanisms over time.
First, in 1959 Lyndon Johnson became the first Senate Majority Leader
ever to stall all pending judicial nominations until President Eisenhower
agreed to nominate his preferred candidate for a judgeship in Johnson's
53
home state.
Johnson's strategy worked; the President nominated
Johnson's friend Joe Fisher to the judgeship, the Senate confirmed Fisher
three days later, and the log-jam was broken.
Second, shortly after assuming the chairmanship of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1979, Ted Kennedy introduced several
54
innovations to judicial confirmation proceedings. He announced that
senators who withheld the "blue slips" of persons nominated for
judgeships from their states could no longer rely on the Chair to kill
55
those nominations. Kennedy directed that every nomination would be
discussed by the full Committee, and the Committee would determine
56
whether to proceed with a nomination by holding a hearing.
In
addition, Kennedy arranged for the Committee to adopt a questionnaire
that all nominees would be required to complete and that, with the
51
See id. (stating that "[When the 102nd Congress adjourned in 1992], the Senate had
not acted on 42 district and 10 appeals court nominations"); see also Clinton's Judges, supra
note 20, at 234 (stating that "at the end of the 106th Congress, 40 [judicial] nominees
languished in the Judiciary Committee ... "); id. at 246 (stating that "[a]t the end of the 106th
Congress, 18 [appeals court] nominations had not been acted upon").
52
See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 135-79.
53
See id. at 138.
" See GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 263.
55
Id.
56
Id.
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exception of a few questions, would be made available to the public.
The Committee also began to routinely publish its confirmation
58
proceedings.
Moreover, Kennedy invited various ~roups to testify
9
An especially
before the Committee and to rate judicial nominees.
important innovation was the establishment of the Committee's own
investigatory staff to examine the backgrounds of judicial nominees
60
apart from Justice Department inquiries.
Third, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin Hatch
had placed all judicial nominations on hold through the first half of 1999.
Part of .the reason why he did this was to wait for the outcome of
President Clinton's impeachment trial in February 1999. He also wanted
to pressure the President to nominate his preferred candidate- Ted
Stewart- to a federal judgeship in his home state of Utah. Eventually,
61
President Clinton and Senator Hatch choreographed an exchange.
President Clinton agreed to begin the vetting process for nominating
Stewart, while Hatch agreed that as long as Stewart continued to
progress through the appointments process, he would initiate hearings
on some pending nominations. In October, the Senate confirmed
Stewart, though most of the other pending nominations never reached
the floor of the Senate for a final vote.
Fourth, in March 2002, the Judiciary Committee rejected, by a strict
party-line vote, President Bush's nomination of Charles Pickering to a
62
seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The vote
infuriated Republicans, including President Bush and Pickering's
sponsor, Minority Leader of the Senate, Trent Lott, both of whom had
lobbied hard for the judge's confirmation. By another strictly partisan
vote, the Committee majority also rejected the President's and Senator
Lott's pleas to allow the nomination to be forwarded to the floor of the
63
Senate for a full vote.
Lott appealed in vain to the Senate Majority
Leader Tom Daschle to intercede and forward the nomination to the
Senate floor. Neither Daschle's and the Committee's refusals to forward
the nomination were unusual. After all, as Majority Leader, Lott had
consistently refused the same entreaties from Daschle when their roles

57
58

59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
See GoLDMAN, supra note 20, at 263..
Id.
See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 141.
See infra note 67.
Id.
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64

were reversed from 1994-2000. Additionally, the Judiciary Committee
for decades had not forwarded to the floor a nomination that a majority
65
had refused to endorse.
Nevertheless, Republican senators, led by
Trent Lott, retaliated immediately through a series of parliamentary
66
maneuvers to impede other business in the Senate. Lott also exacted
revenge against Daschle by announcing he would no longer support
Daschle's preferred candidate for a Democratic slot on the Federal
Communications Commission, thus impeding the candidate's
67
nomination.
Fifth, after regaining control of the Senate last year, Democrats have
succeeded in slowing down the pace of judicial confirmation
proceedings. By the end of 2001, the Senate had confirmed only 28 of
68
Moreover, of President
President Bush's 80 judicial nominations.
Bush's first eleven circuit court nominations made in May of 2001, the
69
Senate has not even held hearings on eight of them. As of this writing,
twenty-two circuit nominations are pending before the Committee, and
President Bush has yet to nominate people for nine other vacancies on
70
the federal courts of appeals. Michigan's two Democratic senators also

" At least two significant events in the fall and winter of 2002 changed the dynamics
of judicial selection for the foreseeable future. First, the Republicans retook control of the
Senate as a result of gains made in the mid-term elections. Second, Lott resigned his
position as Majority Leader in December as a consequence of arguably racist remarks he
had made on the occasion of Strom Thurmond's retirement from the Senate. Lott's
successor as Majority Leader, Bill Frist, promised, like Lott before him, to make the
confirmation of the President's judicial nominees a priority in the 108th Congress.
65
See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 235.
"' See James W. Brosnan, Federal Bench Nominees Left in Limbo: Bickering Curdles Senate
into Inaction, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 23, 2002, at Al.
67
See AI Kamen, Comma-Kaze, Lott and Daschle at War, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2002, at A21
("A furious Lott vowed to retaliate [for failed nomination of Pickering] and blocked the
appointment of Jonathon S. Adelstein, Daschle's top communications aide, to a Democratic
vacancy on the Federal Communications Commission."); Michael Petrocelli, Pickering
Fallout Persists; GOP Shuts Down Committees in Retaliation for Snub, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 21,
2002, at A6; Ana Radelat, Lott Facing Toughest Time Since Losing Control of Senate, GANNETT
NEWSSERV., Mar. 22,2002.
68
David G. Savage, The World & Nation; Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for SO in the
Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at Al.
69
The nominations in which the Senate had not acted by May 2001 include legal
scholar Michael McConnell nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
John Roberts nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (almost a
decade after the Senate had failed to act on his nomination to the same court by President
George H.W. Bush), and Carolyn Kuhl nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. For the current status of federal court nominees before the Judiciary
Committee, see United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nominations to U.S. Courts of
Appeals, available at http:/ /www.senate.gov I -judiciary /nominations_appeals.cfm.
70
See Brosnan, supra note 66.
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have put holds on all three of the President's nominees to the U.S. Court
of Appeals in retaliation against the Republicans' fatal blocks of two
71
Democratic nominees to the same court.
Senator Patrick Leahy of
72
Vermont, the outgoing Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has
explained that the delays are due to some extent to the need to handle
other priorities including anti-terrorist legislation. On the other hand,
Republicans charge that the delays are attributable primarily to the
preferences of Committee Democrats for liberal activist judges and
hostility to qualified conservative judicial nominees. In all likelihood,
the delays are payback for the Republicans' unprecedented delays of
3
President Clinton's judicial nominations/ including 41 at the end of his
74
administration.
As these and many other examples amply illustrate, senators'
opposition or resistance to judicial nominees is attributable to many
different reasons, including but not limited to doubts about the
nominees' qualifications. To be sure, there has never been any consensus
in the Senate on the minimal qualifications for federal judges. Nor has
there been any meaningful agreement in recent years on whether there is
some objective measure or arbiter of judicial qualifications, with one
major exception. The exception is that senators over the years have
insisted that judicial nominees have, inter alia, the requisite integrity to
serve as federal judges. Hence, nominees' ethical lapses are a frequently
75
cited basis for rejecting or opposing many judicial nominations.
Other common questions that have arisen about nominees'
qualifications have to do with their trial practice (particularly for district
judges), temperament, participation in activities unsuitable for judges
(such as membership in discriminatory clubs), and judicial philosophy.
Three dramatic illustrations of these concerns in practice are: {1) the
Senate Judiciary Committee's close vote on former Connecticut
6
Governor Thomas Meskill/ (2) the forced withdrawal of President
Reagan's nomination of former Louisiana Governor David Treen to the

" Id.
72
As a consequence of the mid-term elections of 2002, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch
became the Chair of the Judiciary Committee in January 2003._
73
See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6.
" See Savage, supra note 68, at Al (quoting Professor Sheldon Goldman).
75
For many examples of rejections based on ethical concerns, see Clinton's Judges, supra
note 20, at 236-37.
76
President Nixon initially nominated Governor Meskill.
President Ford renominated Meskill to the Second Circuit in spite of the ABA's rating of him as "not
qualified." This led the Ford administration to avoid thereafter nominating other people
rated by the ABA as "not qualified."
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Fifth Circuit based on his past participation in the segregationist
Louisiana States' Rights Party, and (3) the Judiciary Committee's
negative vote on President Reagan's nomination of Jeff Sessions to a
federal district judgeship in Alabama and split vote on forwarding it to
the Senate floor (effectively killing it) based on several racially
insensitive statements made by Sessions.
III. ACHIEVING PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE

For presidents and senators to achieve peaceful co-existence in the
appointment process is not easy, particularly in times of divided
government. Even when the same party controls both the White House
and the Senate, peaceful co-existence is hard to achieve. Woodrow
Wilson and Bill Clinton both endured in the first years of their respective
presidencies tense relations with their fellow Democrats for the same
basic reason. Each became the first Democratic president after relatively
long periods in which the other party had occupied the White Housesixteen for Wilson and twelve for Clinton. Thus, from the outset of these
presidencies, many Democratic senators felt they were long overdue in
having their preferred candidates fill the vacant judgeships in their
77
respective states. Clinton's difficulties clearly extended to the selection
of Supreme Court justices. Even though Democrats controlled the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the Senate, he did not want to expend precious
political capital in defending his nominees in protracted confirmation
proceedings. Instead, he preferred to expend these resources on
78
legislative priorities.
More generally, presidents have pursued at least three strategies to
deal with the difficulties in achieving peaceful co-existence in judicial
selection. More generally, the first is simply to abdicate presidential
authority in choosing nominees and defer almost completely to senators'
preferences. Such deference was relatively common throughout the
nineteenth century, particularly when the same party controlled the
White House and the Senate and judicial nominations were made on the
79
basis of party affiliation and activity.
77

78

See GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 98-99.
See DAVID A. YALOF, PuRSUIT OF JUSTICES:

PRESIDENTIAL POLffiCS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 196-207 (1999).
79
Kermit Hall comprehensively examines the patterns of judicial appointments in the
19th century. He notes, for example, that Martin Van Buren's judicial appointments were
"more party directed than [those made] during Jackson's administrations." Hall, supra
note 18. Van Buren made 17lower court nominations; and, unlike Jackson's, Van Buren's
nominees, with only one exception, met no opposition in the Senate. Id. Similarly, in
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In the twentieth century, the President who came closest to complete
80
abdication was Warren G. Harding.
Indeed, the Republican party
establishment backed Harding as President in part because it believed he
would cede to its preferences for lower court judicial nominees and other
important appointments. This is an inference from the fact that
Republicans backed Harding in part because they believed they would
have more authority with him as President. As President, Harding made
clear from the outset his desire to return to "normalcy," which in the
area of judicial selection meant granting to the senators from his party
their preferred choices to fill the judgeships in their respective states.
A second strategy is to accept, perhaps even to invite, some conflict
over judicial appointments to demonstrate the President's strength and
to define the President and his enemies through such conflicts. Perhaps
the most dramatic example of a nineteenth-century president who
followed this strategy was Andrew Jackson. In the twentieth century,
81
82
William Howard Taft and, to a lesser extent, Ronald Reagan and
George W. Bush willingly fought with the Senate over some
•
83
appomtments.
A third strategy entails negotiating and otherwise coordinating or
managing the governing norms of judicial selection to achieve or
84
maintain relatively peaceful co-existence.
Negotiations between
presidents and senators have produced many different arrangements.
Some of these arrangements have included: the creation of new

making ten lower court judicial appointments as president, Zachary Taylor "wielded ...
judicial patronage in an outwardly party-directed fashion." Id. The same was true later in
the century for Republican presidents Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur; and Grover Cleveland
based all thirty-four of his lower court appointments on party considerations. Id.
"' HARRIS, supra note 28, at 116.
81
See id. at 166-67; GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 100-01.
82
See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 286-96.
83
See Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing, reprinted in FDCH POLffiCAL
TRANSCRIPTS, Mar. 14,2002 (stating that "the greatest consequence of this Senate committee
killing this nomination if they do so will be injustice in America on delays in the court on
the number of vacancies in the court... what's so distressing about the process the Senate
leadership has chosen to take [with respect to Judge Pickering is that it is] a partisan one,
that defies bipartisanship ... "); Joseph Curl, Bush Links Vote on Pickering to Constitution,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, at A10 (reporting that "[Bush says] today's Senate Judiciary
Committee vote on the nomination of Uudge Pickering] will illustrate whether Congress
has a deep respect for the Constitution and for the president's right and responsibility to
nominate qualified judges"}; Bill Sammon, Bush Marshals Backers for Pickering, WASH. DMES,
Mar. 7, 2002, at A3 (reporting that "[Bush calls] Pickering a fine jurist, a man of quality and
integrity [and warned] against a Senate process that would malign a man such as him").
84
See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6.
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judgeships over which presidents have greater latitude to fill;
appointing people from under-represented groups without taking
opportunities away from established constituencies; senators' providing
lists of names of acceptable candidates chosen pursuant to criteria set
forth by an adrninistrationr states with senators from both parties
87
alternating in making recommendations to the President; and making a
trade in which a senator gets his or her preference for a judicial
appointment on a court in exchange for the President's getting his
88
preferred candidate appointed to the same (or some other) court.
Some negotiations between presidents and senators are more visible
than others, and the degree or extent of visibility is a factor in their
success. For instance, President Dwight Eisenhower, who generally
89
preferred to operate through a hidden hand, set the guiding principles
for judicial selection and charged the Justice Department with the
responsibility for implementing them. His staff largely insulated him
from the political pressures of the process. In practice, this meant that
the Justice Department became "the locus of dealing with members of
90
Congress," and neither Eisenhower nor his Justice Department ever
directly challenged the Senate. Hence, the Senate did not reject any of

See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 243-52. President Carter used this strategy to
appoint people from under-represented groups without taking opportunities away from
established constituencies. See, e.g., id. at 250.
86
President Regan cut a deal with the Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and the
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee Strom Thurmond "to give the administration
more flexibility in naming district judges while retaining senatorial influence." GOLDMAN,
supra note 20, at 287-88. The plan was for Republican senators to provide the President
with a list of three to five names for each judicial vacancy to be filled in their respective
states. The recommendations were to be made pursuant to criteria set forth by the
administration. While the plan was successfully implemented early in Regan's presidency,
it eventually fell apart. Id. at 288-90. Some Republican senators chafed from the outset at
having to meet any selection criteria and went back to recommending to the President only
a single name for each vacancy in their states, while the slate of people recommended by
other senators became meaningless because they simply signaled their preferences through
other channels. Id.
87
Variations of this practice were used by New York's senators from the 1970s through
the 1990s, as well as by Washington's two senators from 1997 until the end of the Clinton
administration. See Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the
Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 299 (1999); Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note
10, at 1710 n. 82.
88
This arrangement was employed, for instance, by President Clinton and
Washington's Senator Slade Gorton to fill two pending vacancies on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. GERHARDT, supra note 6, at 140.
89
See FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN HAND PRESIDENCY: EISENHOWER As LEADER
57-59 (Basic Books 1982).
90
GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 131.
85
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his nominees. To be sure, there were conflicts, and Eisenhower could be
embarrassed or coerced into accepting a senator's preference as he did
with Lyndon Johnson in 1959. Yet, senators from both parties quickly
came to realize and accept that most trading occurred below radar and
thus without public awareness or scrutiny.
In contrast, Bill Clinton's negotiations with senators often became
public, and the more public they became the more it became a liability
91
for Clinton and his nominees. Clinton's initial strategy was to avoid
any public fights over judicial nominees. He reasoned that the fewer
high profile contests the less likelihood of campaigns being waged for
92
and against nominees for the sake of scoring political points. In other
words, lowering the visibility of the judicial selection process would help
to de-politicize the judicial selection process, because it would increase
the likelihood of a more professional, less politically explosive
negotiation over the merits of particular appointments. Indeed, Clinton
and his advisers invested less in nominating particular people than in
nominating particular kinds of nominees. Their objective, which they
believe they largely achieved, was to improve the quality and diversity
of judicial appointments. They viewed many prospective candidates as
fungible, allowing them to gravitate away from the candidates likely to
promise trouble and towards those that seemed to hold greater promise
of relatively easy confirmation.
Clinton's strategy and its implementation came at a price, besides its
culminating in only one judicial nominee - Ronnie White - being
93
formally rejected by the Senate. First, the strategy contained the seeds
of its own undoing. Clinton's hope to avoid high-profile contests over
judicial appointments merely signaled to opposition senators that they
were likely to prevail in any contest so long as they signaled their
willingness to wage a highly visible campaign against a nominee. Once
Clinton backed down early in his presidency when faced with such
threats, he signaled the effectiveness of making the threat to wage a
protracted, visible contest over a judicial appointment. Thus, senators
recognized that the greatest leverage they had in negotiating with

See generally GERHARDT, supra note 6.
See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to
Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 256-57 (1997); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's
Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 80 JUDICATURE 264, 284 (1999): Sheldon
Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 29091

92

91 (1995).
93
See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 232. For the story of the confirmation contest
over White's nomination, see id. at 232, 239-41.
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Clinton over prospective nominees was threatening to make a public
contest and thus forcing the President to decide whether or not he
wanted to expend his political capital in such a fight.
Second, the bargaining phase of Clinton's judicial selection entailed an
entirely new approach in the pre-nomination phase of judicial selection.
Clinton and others began to see a perverse advantage to publicizing the
pre-nomination phase of the process. While this practice helped the
administration to settle on relatively strong nominees for many
judgeships, it subjected many people to public evisceration. Indeed, the
floating of possible candidates for judgeships became a substitute for the
confirmation process because the administration would often make
choices of nominees based on the extent to which they could survive
such public vetting. Senators and interest groups figured they could
influence the choices of possible nominees by quickly and publicly
condemning or promoting certain nominees. In time, a relatively
unseemly process evolved in which negotiations over nominees no
longer occurred behind closed doors, as it had during the Eisenhower
94
administration, but rather in newspapers and other public fora.
Third, Clinton's bargaining was further complicated by his
impeachment and other legislative priorities. Clinton needed to bargain
in order to maintain or cultivate political support for other important
initiatives, including his own survival in office. As a practical matter,
this meant that he was often bargaining from a position of weakness.
Thus, once made, his nominees could not rely solely on him for their
success and thus languished when he had to expend his political coinage
on other matters. As Sheldon Goldman reports, Republican staffers
acknowledged that one important reason many of Clinton's judicial
nominees languished in his final year in office is that no one- not even
Clinton - seemed willing to expend any efforts to get them hearings
95
much less floor votes.
Interestingly, one tactic that helped Clinton and other presidents in the
past (but notably not President George W. Bush in fighting for Pickering)
was to take the initiative in making and fighting on behalf of a highprofile nomination. This tactic is extremely important for avoiding
submission like that of President Harding. Moreover, this tactic has been
used effectively by some presidents to clarify early on what they want
and the preferences over which they will fight. Even though President
Reagan clearly set the appointment of conservatives to the lower courts

94

95

See YALOF, supra note 78, at 196-207.
See Clinton's Judges, supra note 20, at 230-31, 238.
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as a major priority of his administration, he picked his fights carefully.
In spite of the extraordinary extent to which Reagan based his
nominations on ideological rather than partisan concerns, Sheldon
Goldman notes, "[a] characteristic of judicial selection during Reagan's
first term was the apparent reluctance to engage in a confirmation fight
in the Senate even if it meant sacrificing a philosophically desirable
97
candidate ... "
Moreover, President Reagan was careful not to
nominate people to the courts of appeals unless he (or his team) was
satisfied "that the nominee shared the administration's judicial
philosophy. When a potential nominee had strong political backing but
doubts were raised about the candidate's philosophical reliability, the
burden was on the candidate's backers to demonstrate that the doubts
98
were unfounded."
This approach reflected respect for senatorial
courtesy and negotiating while preserving and underscoring President
Reagan's basic commitment to making judicial appointments a highprofile priority of his administration. President Reagan's willingness to
use his popularity to fight for his nominees provided formidable
leverage on their behalf, though it coincided significantly with his
party's control of the Senate.
Both Presidents Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt were at least as
equally interested in their judicial nominees' philosophy as President
Reagan, but they often engaged in deals to consolidate party support and
99
to promote their domestic agendas, particularly during times of war.

%

Of course, there were some high-profile contests over some judicial nominations.

See GoLDMAN, supra note 20. The administration was apparently willing to fight over some
but not other nominees because of the strength of the nominees' likely political backing or
because it was trying to effectuate or implement a deal or trade. Id.
97
Id. at 299-300.
•• Id. at 305.
99
Lincoln's deference was not, however, automatic or extreme; it was usually based on
each side getting something out of the appointment.
Lincoln's Supreme Court
appointments would prove to be different only in degree not in kind from the other
appointments he made as president. Consequently, he generally deferred to congressional
leaders on the candidates for filling vacancies with the primary condition that they met
criteria set forth for their selection by the President. In all six appointments he made to the
Court, Lincoln faced no serious conflict with senators but instead was able to find
nominees agreeable to Republican leaders each time.
Franklin D. Roosevelt is a second example of a president adept at employing
institutional norms to get his way. When he finally got an opportunity to fill a vacancy on
the Court, it did not happen until the beginning of his second term. When the vacancy
finally arose in 1937, it proved to be a pivotal one, for the retiring justice was one of the
most ardent opponents to constitutional foundations of the New Deal - Willis Van
DeVanter. There was no question there would be a fight, because the appointment, if
confirmed, would produce for the first time in the Court's history a critical mass of justices
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Lincoln was notorious at employing patronage to secure support for
100
party unity as well as his domestic agenda.
This is especially evident
with his six Supreme Court appointments, all of which were made with
101
significant input by party and Senate leaders.
Similarly, Franklin
Roosevelt was acutely sensitive to prospective nominees' political
backing throughout his presidency, particularly during World War II.
As Sheldon Goldman further observes, "When the political backing was
exceptionally strong and there were questions raised as to the
candidate's fidelity to the New Deal, the benefit of the doubt was often
102
given to the candidate."
Roosevelt's willingness to compromise
stemmed from his recognition of the long-term benefits of agreeing to a
particular senator's choices. Thus, he would often consider the impact
his choice of a nominee would have on a senator's support for his
103
administration.
As the Lincoln and Roosevelt examples illustrate, a great deal depends
on the popularity of the war during which judicial selection takes place.
Only a few presidents have made Supreme Court nominations in times
of war, and only Lincoln and Roosevelt were fighting for a cause popular
with most senators. The point at which Roosevelt's approach to
Supreme Court selection most closely resembled Lincoln's was the 1940s,
the period in which the nation formally entered the Second World War.
In these years, Roosevelt's nominees were Jimmy Byrnes in June 1941,
Harlan Fiske Stone as Chief Justice in June 1941 (the day on which the
Senate confirmed Byrnes), and Wiley Rutledge in February 1943. Byrnes
was a former senator and thus able to take advantage of senatorial
courtesy. Stone was a Republican whose nomination bespoke of
bipartisanship and a desire on the part of the President to put aside party
differences as best he could under the circumstances. Rutledge was a
relatively inoffensive nominee whom most senators did not know or
who opposed economic due process and supported greater judicial deference to
congressional exercises of its Commerce Clause power. Roosevelt was not interested in a
compromise. His nomination proved to be surprising not because he turned to a senator or
an ardent supporter of the New Deal but rather he turned to someone who, as a senator,
had not been known as a great constitutional thinker (like Sutherland) but as an ardent
partisan. The views of his nominee, Hugo Black, were well known to his colleagues in the
Senate, but the powerful norm of senatorial deference to the nomination of a colleague to
the Court worked in Black's favor and led many senators who might have opposed him
otherwise to accept his nomination begrudgingly.
100
See DAVID HERBERT DoNALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED: ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR
ERA 173-74 (3d ed. 2001).
101
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 393 (2002).
102
GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 33.
103
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take the time to know.
Other Presidents, who have made judicial nominations in times of
war, have not had their judicial nominees receive special deference
because their nominations coincided with an ongoing military conflict. It
is possible one reason that none received special deference is that neither
the Korean nor Vietnam conflict was popular (especially over time) with
the American people. Another plausible reason they received no special
deference is that senators drew a distinction between domestic and
foreign policy and thus their support for the latter did not have any
effect on their support for the former.
CONCLUSION

I have tried to suggest war is not inevitable in judicial selection. It can
be avoided if political leaders choose to follow the norms they have
developed over the years for guiding the process. War breaks out when
national political leaders, particularly presidents, breach these norms.
Since war is, in Clausewitz' famous judgment, an extension of politics,
one is left to wonder about the politics or motives driving combat over
judicial appointments. In considering the reasons for combat, I cannot
help but recall a question raised by Winston Churchill in the midst of
World War II. When asked whether the East End of London should be
shut down and theater productions stopped because of the bombing of
the city, Churchill responded, "No. What the hell do you think we are
fighting for?" As combats erupt over judicial appointments, it is useful
to ask, in a similar vein, "What the hell are each of the sides fighting for,
and what do these contests tell us about them and, more importantly,
us?"

***

